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BATF GUN TRACE DATA AND THE ROLE OF ORGANIZED GUN 
TRAFFICKING IN SUPPLYING GUNS TO CRIMINALS 
GARY KLECK* 
To what degree do criminals obtain their guns, directly or indirectly, as a 
result of the activities of large-scale organized gun traffickers?  This paper 
reviews evidence bearing on this issue, along with an assessment of the value 
of gun tracing data for drawing conclusions about the importance of gun 
trafficking. 
Any isolated instance of an unlawful transfer of a firearm could be 
technically regarded as “gun trafficking,” and thus a person who on occasion 
has illegally sold a gun could technically be described as a “gun trafficker.”  
However, this does not seem any more meaningful than describing a person 
who has privately sold their car to another private person as a “car dealer.”  
Many criminals sell guns they happen to come across in the course of 
burglaries and other thefts, but they are not in the business of selling guns.  A 
more meaningful definition of a gun trafficker would be a person who 
persistently engages in a significant number of illicit gun sales for the purpose 
of profit, however one might define “significant.” 
Two varieties of gun trafficking have been the focus of especially strong 
law enforcement interest: (1) sales by federally licensed dealers in violation of 
the law, typically involving unrecorded sales to persons whom the dealer 
knows, or should know, are not legally entitled to purchase guns (“corrupt 
dealers”), and (2) unlawful gun sales by persons not licensed to be in the 
business of selling guns (“illicit dealers”).  The former would primarily acquire 
their guns via lawful purchases from gun distributors, while the latter might 
acquire them through many different routes, including gun thefts, purchases 
from gun thieves, direct purchases from licensed dealers, or indirect purchases 
from dealers via “strawman purchasers” who buy guns from dealers with the 
intention of turning them over to the illicit dealer.  The second type would 
include interstate “gun runners” who buy guns through resident “straw 
purchasers” in jurisdictions with weaker gun controls and move them to 
jurisdictions with stronger controls. 
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Florida 32306-1127. 
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The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF), the agency 
charged with enforcing federal gun laws, has a vested interest in stressing the 
importance of these two varieties of organized gun trafficking, because they 
are the main channels of criminal gun acquisition that BATF is effectively 
organized to control.  BATF can justify budget requests in the gun enforcement 
area to the extent that they can persuade policy-makers that the gun trafficking 
on which they focus their efforts supplies a significant share of the guns used 
to commit crimes, and that reducing gun trafficking can therefore play a role in 
reducing violent crime.  Likewise, “one-gun-a-month” laws that limit handgun 
sales to a single purchase per month are based on the theory that significant 
numbers of guns are supplied to criminals as a result of illicit gun dealers and 
their straw-purchaser associates acquiring large numbers of guns from licensed 
dealers. In particular, BATF enforcement efforts will appear sensible if there 
are significant numbers of large-volume organized traffickers, whether corrupt 
licensees or illicit dealers, since BATF does not have the resources to 
investigate every person involved in three or four unlawful gun sales a year.  
BATF therefore does its best to identify and arrest larger volume gun 
traffickers (BATF 1997a, p. 2), because focusing their scarce enforcement 
resources on “traffickers” who sell only a few guns each year would not be 
cost effective.  As with law enforcement efforts against illicit drugs, the more 
dispersed the illicit movement of guns is, the less effective law enforcement 
efforts aimed at a small number of relatively high volume traffickers are likely 
to be. 
In this light, it is not surprising that BATF reports routinely include 
anecdotal accounts, drawn from their investigative case files, of relatively high 
volume traffickers, accounts that hint, in the absence of any caveats to the 
contrary, that such dealers account for a significant share of the guns obtained 
by criminals and used to commit crimes (e.g., BATF 1990; 1995a; 1995b, pp. 
18, 21, 22).  Further, the Bureau has explicitly stated that, based on recent 
tracing studies, “a large proportion of crime guns recovered from juveniles, 
and adult felons, are most likely deliberately and illegally trafficked” (U.S. 
BATF 1999, p. 26).  BATF has not committed itself as to what “a large 
proportion” might mean, but it clearly believes that gun traffickers supply a 
significant share of the guns used by criminals.  To what extent is this view 
supported by systematic evidence? 
GUN TRACING DATA AS EVIDENCE OF ORGANIZED GUN TRAFFICKING 
The impression that gun trafficking accounts for a significant share of 
criminals’ guns relies heavily on BATF analyses of guns for which traces have 
been requested, along with their investigative files on caught traffickers (U.S. 
BATF 1995a; 1997a; 1999). 
A gun trace typically starts with a request from a law enforcement agency 
requesting a trace on a gun that they have recovered from an arrested criminal.  
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1999] BATF GUN TRACE DATA AND THE ROLE OF ORGANIZED GUN 25 
The originating agency provides BATF with the gun’s manufacturer, model, 
and serial number, when available.  BATF then asks the gun’s manufacturer to 
whom they sold the gun; this buyer, typically a gun wholesaler/distributor, is 
asked to whom they sold the gun, which is thereby traced to a licensed retail 
gun dealer, and finally to the first retail purchaser, assuming all legally 
required forms have been completed and retained. 
A trace by itself ordinarily cannot directly tell BATF how the gun got from 
its first retail purchaser to the criminal from whom the police recovered the 
gun.  However, the information available to BATF from a successful trace can 
provide some weak, indirect clues as to how a traced crime gun might have 
traveled to the criminal.  For example, if some kind of organized gun 
trafficking was involved, it is more likely that the gun was purchased in a state 
with weaker gun laws and then sold to a buyer in a state with stricter laws, 
where it is more likely that there are buyers willing to pay more than the 
normal retail price.  Thus, it is more likely that a trafficked gun was first sold 
at retail in a state different from the one in which it was recovered by police, 
compared to guns acquired without the involvement of organized gun 
traffickers. 
Likewise, since a trafficker cannot make money from unsold inventory, it 
is likely that a trafficked gun will be sold to a criminal user fairly soon after it 
was purchased by the trafficker.  As a result, it is more likely to have a short 
“time-to-crime,” i.e. a short span from its sale to a retail customer such as the 
trafficker or a straw purchaser acting on the trafficker’s behalf to the time of its 
recovery by police.  In recent reports, BATF analysts have explicitly inferred 
the involvement of “black market” dealers or illegal traffickers from the fact 
that many guns recovered from criminals were “quite new” and “rapidly 
diverted” from their first retail sales by licensed dealers (U.S. BATF 1997a, p. 
8; 1999, p. 8). 
Finally, a trafficked gun is more likely to have had its serial numbers 
obliterated.  BATF has flatly asserted that “crime guns with obliterated serial 
numbers are likely to have been illegally trafficked” (U.S. BATF 1997a, p. 8), 
implying that a majority of such guns have been trafficked.  If either a corrupt 
licensee or an unlicensed trafficker was involved in an unlawful sale of a gun, 
it is in their interest to remove the serial numbers from the gun.  A licensee 
who has sold a gun out of his stock to an ineligible buyer knows that there is a 
record, which includes the gun’s serial number, of the gun having been sold to 
him, and does not want a gun used in a crime being traced back to him.  
Likewise, an unlicensed trafficker who used straw purchasers to acquire guns 
for him would also not want a crime gun to be traceable to any of these 
criminal associates, for fear that they might lead the authorities to him.  When 
the serial number is obliterated, it becomes much harder, though not 
impossible, to successfully trace a crime gun. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
26 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:23 
In sum, out-of-state origins, short time-to-crime, and an obliterated serial 
number are probably correlates of organized gun trafficking, i.e. a trafficked 
gun is probably more likely to have these attributes than a gun that was not 
trafficked.  It would, however, be a logical error to reverse the logic and 
assume that a gun having one or more of these indicators is, or is likely to be, a 
trafficked gun.  Of the three indicators, only an obliterated serial number is 
likely to be a fairly strong indicator of the involvement of gun traffickers in 
supplying the gun to criminals, because there are far more likely reasons, 
besides the involvement of trafficking, why a gun had either a short time-to-
crime or out-of-state origins. 
Short Time-to-Crime as an Indicator of  the Involvement of Traffickers 
Kennedy and his colleagues interpreted evidence concerning traced guns in 
Boston as indicating that guns that moved quickly from first retail sale to 
involvement in a crime “may be the product of . . . higher-volume trafficking” 
(1996b, p. 174).  Nevertheless, one cannot legitimately infer from a short time-
to-crime that gun trafficking was responsible for the movement of a gun to a 
criminal, since one cannot assume that guns have to be trafficked to get into 
criminals’ hands quickly.  Newer guns may be disproportionately common 
among the guns used by criminals simply because criminals are mostly young 
people (U.S. FBI 1997, pp. 224-5) who have been of a gun-owning age for a 
relatively short time, and thus are likely to have acquired a gun only relatively 
recently (Kleck 1997, p. 373).  Since most gun acquisitions are of new guns 
(Cook and Ludwig 1997, p. 24), this implies that most people who acquired a 
gun in the past few years, even if they did not get it from a gun trafficker, 
would be in possession of a “new” gun, i.e. one recently manufactured. 
Therefore, since nearly all young people who own guns acquired them 
relatively recently, a disproportionately large share of their guns will be fairly 
new, regardless of whether they were used for criminal or noncriminal 
purposes, and regardless of whether they were obtained from gun traffickers. 
Consistent with this view, Kennedy and his colleagues (1996a) found that, 
among gun criminals in Boston during the period 1991-1995, the younger the 
criminal was, the more likely it was that the gun they used was relatively new.  
Among guns recovered by police and used to commit violent crimes, the share 
that were less than two years old was 23% for criminals age 21 or less, 16% 
among those age 22-29, and just 14% among those age 30 or older. 
Another reason for the overrepresentation of newer guns among criminals 
is the larger supply of stolen guns to which they have access.  Almost everyone 
prefers new guns over old ones, but normally only people who can afford the 
generally higher prices of new guns can act on this preference.  Criminals, 
however, have access to a larger-than-average supply of stolen guns because 
they associate with other criminals, including those who steal guns.  According 
to Wright and Rossi (1986, p. 233), criminals generally pay discounted prices 
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for guns, a fact that these authors attributed to the large supply of stolen guns 
in criminals’ milieu.  In later surveys of juveniles, Sheley and Wright again 
found that “cash prices paid on the street were clearly much less than the 
normal retail price” (1995, p. 50). Since the new guns among the stock of 
stolen weapons are generally available at a less-than-retail price, criminals can 
more frequently act on the preference for new guns. 
Out-of-State Origins as an Indicator that a Gun Was Trafficked 
Kennedy and his colleagues also suggested that, under the assumption that 
“interstate gun trafficking requires at least a modicum of organization and 
capital,” a large share of out-of-state guns among crime guns supports a view 
that “higher volume trafficking” is supplying guns to criminals (1996b, p. 
174).  It would, however, be misleading to reverse the logic and infer from the 
fact that a gun used in a crime in one state was first sold at retail in another 
state that organized gun traffickers were responsible for the movement of the 
gun across state lines. 
Instead, a large share of interstate gun movement is a routine by-product of 
gun owners changing their state of residence.  From 1985 to 1990, 9.4% of the 
U.S. population moved their residence across state lines (U.S. Bureau of the 
Census 1994, p. 19).  Since they moved their possessions with them, it means 
that any guns stolen from cross-state migrants, used in a crime, recovered by 
police and then traced by BATF would show up as “out-of-state” guns, even if 
none of them had been moved as a result of gun trafficking. 
If gun ownership is as common among movers as among nonmovers, then 
about 9.4% of the civilian gun stock of 236 million or more guns (Kleck 1997, 
p. 97) also moves across state lines in any five year period, or at least 22 
million guns.  Over a longer period of time, a still larger share of guns would 
be moved across state lines, even without any involvement of gun traffickers.  
For example, if a different 9.4% of the gun-owning population moved their 
residences across state lines every five years, a majority of the U.S. gun stock 
would be moved across state lines in just 30 years, less than half of a human 
lifetime. 
Further, because urban residents are especially mobile (U.S. Bureau of the 
Census 1994), guns owned by people in the cities where most gun crimes are 
committed (U.S. FBI 1998, p. 201), and most gun traces therefore originate, 
are especially likely to have different-state origins as a routine by-product of 
people changing their residence.  Likewise, criminals are disproportionately 
young adults (U.S. FBI 1998, p. 232) and young adults are especially mobile 
(U.S. Bureau of the Census 1997), so criminals are especially likely to have 
changed their residence at some time in their lives.  Thus, such criminals 
would move their possessions, including any guns in their possession, across 
state lines.  If they later used the guns in crimes, the guns were recovered by 
police, and the guns were traced by BATF, they would indeed show up as out-
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of-state guns, but not because of the involvement of any interstate gun 
traffickers.  In this case, the mobility of the guns’ criminal owners themselves 
would be responsible for the interstate movement of the guns. 
Consequently, even though trafficked guns probably are more likely to 
have the aforementioned attributes, the share of crime guns that have out-of-
state origins, like the share that had a short time-to-crime, should not be 
viewed as even a rough indicator of the frequency of involvement of interstate 
gun traffickers in the movement of guns. 
EVIDENCE CONCERNING A STRONGER INDICATOR OF TRAFFICKING 
INVOLVEMENT - OBLITERATED SERIAL NUMBERS 
Out-of-state origins and short time-to-crime of crime guns are weak 
indicators that the guns were trafficked, because there are other common 
reasons for crime guns to have these attributes that have nothing to do with gun 
trafficking.  On the other hand, another indicator is somewhat stronger because 
there is less likely to be a nontrafficking explanation for its presence.  If the 
serial number on a crime gun has been obliterated, one likely explanation is 
that a person involved in gun trafficking removed the serial number to make it 
harder to trace the gun back to him or to confederates such as persons making 
straw purchases on his behalf (Kennedy et al. 1996b).  But since this is not the 
only reason a gun might have an obliterated serial number, even this is not an 
ironclad indicator that a gun has been trafficked.  As Kennedy et al. (1996b, 
pp. 174-5) noted, not all such guns were necessarily trafficked, since burglars 
who stole a gun might also obliterate serial numbers to avoid being tied to the 
burglary through possession of an object whose serial number had been 
reported to the police. 
One would expect that if traffickers operated in significant numbers 
anywhere, it would be in cities with unusually strict local or state gun 
regulations.  In other places, since lawful gun ownership is widespread, a large 
pool of stolen guns is likely to be circulating among criminals, driving down 
prices of illicit guns and reducing profit opportunities for illicit dealers. 
Thus, cities such as New York City, Boston, and Washington, D.C. should 
be upper-limit test cases - one would expect gun traffickers to account for a 
larger share of crime guns there than almost anywhere else.  In New York City, 
handgun possession is effectively banned (Kleck 1991, pp. 354-6).  Among 
7,136 handguns recovered by New York City police in August 1, 1997 to July 
31, 1998, 1,115, or 15.6%, had partially or completely obliterated serial 
numbers (U.S. BATF 1999, pp. 42-3).  Kennedy and his colleagues (1996a) 
analyzed 3,543 crime guns recovered by Boston police in 1992-1995, and 
found that only 7% of guns used to commit violent crimes (by offenders of all 
ages) had obliterated serial numbers.  Thus, even in a city subject to unusually 
strict gun laws, where opportunities for gun traffickers to profit should be at 
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their maximum, probably less than 7% of crime guns recovered by policed 
showed some solid indication of having been trafficked. 
Another such upper-limit case would be Washington, D.C., where handgun 
possession or purchase is prohibited.  Of 1,771 firearms recovered by 
Washington police in 1992, including those linked to gun possession cases, 
only 121, or 6.8% had obliterated serial numbers (U.S. BATF 1992, p. 21).  
Again, even in a city with extremely strict local gun laws, only a small share of 
crime guns showed any solid indications of having been trafficked. 
Presumably, in cities with less stringent laws, and thus less local demand for 
trafficked guns, the share of guns that would show signs of having been 
trafficked would be even lower. 
THE UNREPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER OF SAMPLES OF TRACED GUNS 
Independent of whether these various trace-linked pieces of information 
tell us anything about the involvement of gun traffickers in supplying guns to 
criminals, data on traced guns cannot provide a reliable picture of guns used to 
commit crimes, because samples of guns submitted by law enforcement 
agencies for tracing by BATF are not a representative sample of guns used in 
crime, while guns that are successfully traced are even less representative.  
Trace samples therefore cannot be used to infer how crime guns in general are 
acquired by criminals, where criminals get guns, what share of crime guns had 
out-of-state origins, or what share of crime guns had been manufactured within 
any given period in the past. 
In fact, even BATF itself has never claimed in its written reports that 
samples of traced guns are representative of crime guns in general.  Quite the 
contrary, their reports sometimes include caveats, albeit somewhat weak, 
vague ones, to the effect that gun traces are done for law enforcement purposes 
and not for “statistical” (i.e. research) purposes. 
There are only two ways one can select a set of guns to study in order to 
draw generalizable conclusions about crime guns in general.  The analyst 
either (1) studies all the guns used in crime, or (2) systematically applies 
probability sampling procedures to choose a representative subset of crime 
guns. Police do not follow either method in selecting guns to be traced.  
Clearly, all crime guns are not traced - less than 2% of guns linked with crimes 
known to the police are ever submitted for tracing (Kleck 1997, p. 112). 
Further, this tiny share of crime guns is obviously not selected randomly.  The 
Congressional Research Service flatly concluded that “the firearms selected for 
tracing do not constitute a random sample and cannot be considered 
representative of the larger universe of all firearms used by criminals, or of any 
subset of the universe” (U.S. Congressional Research Service 1992, p. 65). 
Put precisely, there is no formal basis for expecting traced guns to be 
representative of all crime guns.  It would simply be a lucky coincidence if the 
subset of guns nonrandomly selected for tracing looked the same as the entire 
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population of crime guns.  Instead, traced gun samples primarily reflect the 
kinds of guns that law enforcement personnel want to trace and that BATF is 
able to trace, not the kinds of guns used in crime. 
THE POTENTIAL FOR EXAGGERATED INDICATIONS OF TRAFFICKING IN  TRACED 
GUN SAMPLES 
Table 1 presents hypothetical data illustrating how much potential there is 
for bias in traced gun samples, given how small a share of crime guns are 
traced. 
Table 1.  The Potential for Bias in Traced Gun Samples 
  All Guns 
Time-to-crime 
under 3 yrs. 
First sold 
at retail 
out of state Trafficked  
All crime guns 10,000 1,000 (10%) 3,000 (30%) 300 ( 3%) 
Traced guns  200   120 (60%)   160 (80%) 100 (50%)  
 
In these hypothetical data, only 10% of crime guns had a short time-to-
crime, only 30% came from a state other than the one in which they were 
recovered by police, and only 3% were trafficked. Yet, analysis of the 2% of 
guns that were traced would lead one to believe that 60% of guns had a short 
time-to-crime, 80% came from out of state, and 50% were trafficked.  Merely 
as a result of a disproportionate police preference for tracing certain kinds of 
guns, it is possible for traced gun samples to give a radically misleading 
picture of crime guns. 
The unrepresentativeness of samples of traced guns is, however, more than 
just a hypothetical mathematical possibility. By comparing samples of traced 
guns with the full set of all guns recovered by police, it has been shown that 
trace samples are not in fact representative of crime guns from general.  For 
example, traced gun samples grossly overstate the share of crime guns that are 
“assault weapons.”  About 8.2% of BATF-traced guns from 1986 to 1990 were 
“assault weapons,” even though only about 1.8% of all the guns recovered by 
police are these types of guns (Kleck 1997, p. 112). 
The Exaggeration of the “New Guns” Share of Crime Guns 
Samples of successfully traced guns also necessarily overstate the share of 
crime guns that had a short time-to-crime, i.e. were “new guns,”  simply 
because BATF is rarely able to successfully trace older guns.  Guns produced 
prior to October of 1968 “are generally untraceable” (U.S. BATF 1999, p. 19) 
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because the record-keeping provisions of the federal Gun Control Act of 1968 
were not in effect before then.  Further, even with respect to many guns 
manufactured after 1968, the BATF National Tracing Center’s “policy was not 
to trace firearms manufactured before 1990, unless specifically requested by a 
law enforcement management official” (p. 19).  The older the gun is, the more 
likely it is that gun dealers, distributors, or manufacturers linked with the gun 
either went out of business (and did not pass on their complete records to 
BATF) or could not provide adequate records for the tracing process to be 
completed (U.S. BATF 1995b; 1997a). 
Among guns recovered by police in 17 cities from 1996-1997, trace 
requests were submitted on 36,777 guns, but only 13,493, or 37% of the trace 
requests resulted in a successful trace of the gun to its point of first retail sale.  
Of the 63% (n=23,284) of the trace requests that were unsuccessful, 53.7% 
(n=12,510) were due to “firearm determined to be too old to trace” (computed 
from data in U.S. BATF 1997a).  Thus, 34% of all guns submitted for tracing 
could not be traced because they were too old.  By excluding almost all of the 
older guns, samples of guns for which traces were completed by BATF 
exaggerate the share of “crime guns” that are relatively new.  Further, because 
older guns are known to be poor candidates for tracing success, it is reasonable 
to expect that police would be less likely to even request a trace on such guns.  
Thus, even samples of guns requested for tracing are likely to overstate the 
share of crime guns that are relatively new, and thereby artificially inflate the 
impression of the involvement of traffickers. 
The Exaggeration of the Out-of-State Share of Crime Guns 
One reason that police request gun traces is because they want to discover 
whether guns are being trafficked into their jurisdiction, and to stop such 
trafficking.  Indeed, BATF has explicitly promoted gun tracing as a crucial 
element in the investigation of gun trafficking, in connection with such BATF-
sponsored efforts such as Project Lead (U.S. BATF 1995b, p. 13). Likewise, 
BATF’s Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative involved the study of “illegal 
youth firearms markets” through the analysis of gun tracing data (U.S. BATF 
1997a). 
As a result, police are especially likely to be interested in the origins of 
crime guns that they already suspect were supplied to criminals by organized 
gun traffickers, such as guns that they know or believe came from out of state.  
When a crime gun in fact did come from another state, police will often have a 
strong reason to suspect its out-of-state origins even before requesting a trace, 
because when they recover crime guns, it is usually in connection with the 
arrest of the criminal who possessed the gun.  In 1997-1998, in New York 
City, a known possessor was identified in trace requests for 85.9% of the crime 
guns for which police requested traces (U.S. BATF 1999, p. 29), indicating 
that the recovery of the gun was probably associated with the arrest of a 
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suspect.  Very likely there were still other cases where a suspect was arrested, 
but not recorded on the trace request form. 
If an arrested suspect has an out-of-state driver’s license, or tells the police 
that he is from out-of-state, or tells them that he obtained the gun from 
someone else he believed had obtained the gun from another state, this is good 
reason for police to believe that the suspect’s gun came from another state. As 
a result, police are able, as well as motivated, to disproportionately request 
traces on out-of-state guns, however infrequently they may come across them, 
causing them to be overrepresented in both samples of guns for which traces 
were requested and in samples of successfully traced guns.  Indeed, since 
requesting a trace on a gun is optional for police, if police wanted to request 
traces only on guns that they had reason to believe came from out-of-state, or 
those that appeared to be new, there would normally be nothing to prevent 
them from doing so, even if such guns claimed only a tiny share of crime guns. 
There is another reason out-of-state guns will be overrepresented in trace 
samples, one that is likely to be particularly important in states with gun 
registration laws. Such states, which include New York, New Jersey, 
Massachusetts, Hawaii, Connecticut, California, Maryland, Indiana, Michigan, 
and Pennsylvania (U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics 1996b), are more likely to 
have statewide records of their own concerning handguns purchased within 
that state and possessed by that state’s residents.  For police agencies in such 
states, a much more direct tracing procedure is to check their own registration 
records first, then turn to BATF for tracing attempts only on those guns not 
traceable using their own state records (Roth and Koper 1997, p. 83).  Since 
the guns with in-state origins can often be traced using the state’s own 
registration records, the guns for which a trace request was submitted to BATF 
from agencies in these states would be disproportionately out-of-state guns, i.e. 
those that could not be traced with in-state records. 
This implies, first of all, that the out-of-state share of BATF-traced guns 
cannot be used to infer the share of all crime guns that came from out of state, 
but it also implies that the overrepresentation of out-of-state guns will be more 
pronounced specifically in states with stricter guns laws, which are more likely 
to have their own handgun registration systems, such as New York, than in 
states with less strict laws and thus without state registration records, such as 
Virginia.  BATF tracing data can therefore give an exaggerated impression that 
interstate gun trafficking is heaviest into states with stricter gun laws, since 
these states are more likely to have their own registration systems that can 
trace the origins of crime guns with in-state origins.  Therefore, the percent of 
traced guns with out-of-state origins cannot be meaningfully compared across 
states, assuming that one is attempting to draw conclusions pertaining to crime 
guns in general rather than just the handful that are traced. 
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GUNS LINKED WITH “FIREARMS OFFENSES” VS. GUNS USED TO COMMIT 
VIOLENT CRIMES 
Another problem with gun trace samples is that most of the guns traced by 
BATF are not “crime guns” in the sense that they were used to commit violent 
crimes like murder, rape, robbery, or assault, and guns that are used in violent 
crimes are different from the rest of the guns in trace samples.  Guns linked 
with violent crimes accounted for only 14.7% of all guns in the U.S. for which 
traces were requested in fiscal year 1996-1997 (Pierce, Briggs, and Carlson 
1998, p. 9).  In contrast, 66.8% of the guns for which traces were requested 
were linked only with “firearms offenses” such as unlawful possession or 
carrying of a firearm, while the rest were linked with a variety of nonviolent 
crimes. Because BATF analyses of traced guns almost never exclude guns 
linked only to firearms offenses, it is impossible to draw conclusions about 
guns actually used to commit violent crimes, even within samples of traced 
guns, since the patterns discovered among traced guns largely reflect patterns 
prevailing among guns linked with gun law violations. 
This would be a trivial matter were it not for the fact that guns linked only 
with weapons law violations do not look like guns used to commit violent 
crimes.  Unlike violent crimes committed with guns, “firearms offenses” such 
as unlicensed carrying of a firearm in a public place are victimless crimes, i.e. 
they do not involve a direct, unwilling victim.  Thus, there is almost never a 
victim connected to a “firearms offense” who serves as a complainant bringing 
the crime to the attention of the police and who might demand that something 
be done about it. Instead, enforcement of firearm laws is commonly initiated 
by police, and thus it is to a great extent a matter of police discretion when, 
where and how often firearms laws are enforced (Kleck 1991, pp. 347-353).  
Consequently, the character of the guns for which traces are requested in 
connection with “firearms offenses” is heavily influenced by police 
enforcement priorities and preferences.  Since the bulk of trace requests and 
completed traces are for guns linked with “firearms offenses,” this means that 
the character of general samples of trace-requested guns and successfully 
traced guns is heavily influenced by these priorities and preferences. 
Since illicit gun trafficking is itself one major “firearms offense,” samples 
of guns for which traces are requested can be heavily affected by investigations 
of gun trafficking, investigations that are initiated by police at their discretion. 
Consequently, it is possible for a large share, a majority, or even all of trace-
requested guns in a given jurisdiction to be trafficked guns, even if only a tiny 
share of all guns used to commit crimes in that jurisdiction were trafficked, 
simply because police chose to focus their enforcement activities on 
traffickers. 
Guns actually used to commit violent crimes appear to be much less likely 
to have been trafficked than guns recovered by police in connection with 
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firearms offenses.  Table 2 shows data compiled from the report by Kennedy 
and his colleagues (1996a) concerning guns recovered from suspects in Boston 
age 21 and younger.  The data consistently indicate that indicators of gun 
trafficking are less prevalent among guns used to commit violent crimes than 
among those linked only with gun law violations. 
 
Table 2.  Traced Guns Linked with Gun Possession vs. Traced Guns Used to 
Commit Violent Crimes, Boston, 1991-1995 
    
  
Gun 
Possession 
Violent 
Crimes 
% with obliterated serial numbers 20.3 11.4 
% with out-of-state origins 67.8 58.3 
% one year old or less 17.5 11.3 
    
Source: Kennedy et al. 1996a; computed from data in Exhibits 25, 26, 42, 
43, and 45. 
 
Thus, general samples of traced guns, because they are dominated by guns 
linked only with gun possession cases, will exaggerate the apparently 
trafficked share of guns used to commit violent crimes.  For this reason, one 
cannot legitimately draw conclusions about the significance of organized gun 
trafficking in supplying violent criminals with guns using general samples of 
traced guns if the samples are not confined to guns used to commit violent 
crimes. 
THE SMALL SHARE OF CRIME GUNS TRACED AND THE POTENTIAL FOR SAMPLE 
BIAS 
Table 3 below illustrates for New York City how few guns used to commit 
violent crimes are successfully traced, and the potential for distortion there is 
in using trace data to draw conclusions about guns used in crime. 
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Table 3.  New York City Violent Gun Crimes and Traces, 
1996   
        
Panel A. The Small Share of Crime Guns Traced (guns 
linked with homicide, rape, robbery or aggravated 
assault)   
        
     Number % of Total 
All gun crimes, reported to police or not1 74,911 100.0 
Gun crimes known to police2 31,163 41.6 
Gun crimes cleared by an arrest3 11,012 14.7 
Gun crimes on which a trace was requested4 2,111 2.8 
Gun crimes for which a trace was completed5 490 0.7 
        
Panel B.  Potential for Distortion in the NYC Trace Data6   
        
   Total Out-of-State % Out-of-State 
All violent crime guns 74,911 14,982 20.57% 
Traced violent crime guns  490  425 86.74% 
 
Panel A shows that less than 1% of violent crimes committed with a gun in 
New York City in 1996 resulted in a successful gun trace, i.e. a trace that could 
establish the state in which the gun was first sold at retail.  This extremely low 
percentage is largely due to the fact that most such crimes are not reported to 
the police, and most of those reported are not cleared by the arrest of an 
 
 1. NCVS data indicate that 41.6% of violent crimes are reported to police (U.S. Bureau of 
Justice Statistics 1997b, p. 84).  31,163 gun crimes reported to police/0.416=74,911. 
 2. U.S. FBI 1997, pp. 18, 29, 32, 139; assumes 10% of rapes were committed by offenders 
armed with a gun. 
 3. U.S. FBI 1997, p. 205, using arrest clearance rates for cities with populations of 1 
million or more as estimates of NYC clearance rates; assumes clearance rates are the same for 
gun crimes as for non-gun crimes. 
 4. U.S. BATF 1997a, p. 8 of New York City section: 1,759 trace requests linked with 
homicide, sex crimes, robbery, or assaults/threats for 10 month period of July 1, 1996-April 30, 
1997.  Multiplied by 12/10 to adjust number up to 12-month figure. 
 5. U.S. BATF 1997a, p. 9 of New York City section: 23.23% of NYC trace requests were 
completed.  2,111 x 0.2323 = 490. 
 6. Assumes that 2.84% of out-of-state guns were traced, and that among traced guns linked 
with the four violent crimes, 86.74% were from out-of-state, as is the case in actual BATF data 
(U.S. BATF 1997a, p. 13). 
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offender, and thus not likely to result in recovery of the gun used to commit the 
crime. 
However, it is also clear that New York City police did not request a trace 
in connection with the vast majority of cleared gun crimes, even though all 
police departments, including the New York City police department, 
participating in the 17-community Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative 
(YCGII) during this period had “agreed to trace all crime guns recovered in 
their jurisdiction” during the 10-month study period (U.S. BATF 1997a, p. 3 of 
Introduction; emphasis in original).  In a later report BATF stated that “the 
effort to achieve comprehensive tracing has not been fully institutionalized” 
(U.S. BATF 1999, p, A-1), apparently an admission that police departments 
were not in fact requesting traces on all crime guns recovered in their 
jurisdictions.  As a result, the YCGII samples of guns are subject to the same 
problems with police selection biases that afflicted the samples in previous 
BATF trace studies, such as a preference for requesting traces on newer guns 
and on guns believed or known to have out-of-state origins. 
In Panel B, one would conclude, if one relied on data pertaining to traced 
guns, that 86.74% of NYC crime guns came from out-of-state, just as BATF 
trace data indeed indicated (U.S. BATF 1997a, p. 13), even though the reality 
assumed in this statistical exercise was that only 20% of all violent crime guns 
came from outside of New York State. 
A somewhat larger share of guns used to commit homicides are traced, but 
the share is, excluding cities participating in the YCGII, nevertheless still quite 
small.  BATF completed traces on only 698 handguns linked with homicides 
committed in New York State in 1993-1996 (Andrews 1998), even though 
there were 7,339 murders and non-negligent manslaughters known to the 
police for this period, 68.6% of them committed with guns, and 62.0% of them 
committed with handguns (U.S. FBI 1994-1997).  Thus, although there were 
about 4,552 handgun homicides (7,339 x 0.620), just 698 of the handguns 
used, or 15.3%, resulted in a successful BATF trace.  Of these 698, 604 were 
traced to out-of-state first retail sales (Andrews 1998, p. 2).  If police chose to 
request BATF traces almost exclusively on guns for which there was already 
some indication of out-of-state origins, perhaps because BATF traces were 
unnecessary for guns already successfully traced using New York state 
handgun registration records, guns from nonNew York sources could claim as 
little as 13.3% (604/4,552) of homicide handguns in New York State.  One 
would expect at least this large an out-of-state share solely as a by-product of 
people moving their residence to New York from other states, so this result 
would be perfectly consistent with the admittedly extreme position that there 
was no interstate gun trafficking into New York at all. 
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ESTIMATES OF THE SHARE OF CRIMINALS’ GUNS THAT WERE TRAFFICKED 
Neither the BATF nor anyone else has been able to document that guns 
trafficked by organized illegal dealers (interstate or otherwise) account for 
more than a tiny share of crime guns. BATF data on out-of-state gun origins 
and time-to-crime indicate nothing definitive about the share of crime guns that 
were trafficked.  The only BATF information bearing directly on this question 
are data on the number of guns known to have been handled by prosecuted gun 
traffickers (U.S. BATF 1995a; 1997b). 
Establishing the trafficked share of guns obtained by criminals requires an 
estimate of the total volume of guns going to criminals.  Interviews with 
incarcerated criminals indicate that 23-32% of handguns obtained by criminals 
were acquired by theft (Burr 1977; Wright and Rossi 1986).  We have 
estimated that at least 750,000 guns are stolen each year, all of which, by 
definition, go directly into the hands of criminals.  Therefore, a rough estimate 
of the total number of guns acquired by criminals each year would be 2.3-3.3 
million (750,000/0.32 = 2.3 million; 750,000/0.23 = 3.3 million). 
On the other hand, the total number of guns trafficked by persons arrested 
by BATF and recommended for prosecution in fiscal years 1996 and 1997 
averaged just 43,000 per year (U.S. BATF 1997b).  Even generously assuming 
that all of the trafficked guns went to criminals, which is unlikely, and that all 
the guns were sold in a single year, these guns would constitute only 1.3-1.9% 
of the guns obtained by criminals.  Thus, identified gun traffickers account for 
less than 2% of guns obtained by criminals, even if one accepts the more 
conservative 2.3 million estimate of the total number of guns obtained by 
criminals. 
Uncaught traffickers also account for a share of criminals’ guns, so the 
total trafficking share would be higher if one included the guns they traffick.  
Likewise, BATF investigations probably do not uncover all of the guns 
trafficked by those they catch.  Nevertheless, even tripling the share claimed 
by caught traffickers to account for these guns would still lead to the 
conclusion that less than 6% of the guns obtained by criminals involved 
organized gun trafficking.  In any case, a claim that gun traffickers account for 
more than one or two percent of the flow of guns into criminal hands would 
have to rely on a heavy dose of speculation. 
Further, there is no evidence that any of the few criminals who obtained 
guns as a result of the activities of traffickers could not have obtained guns 
from other sources.  Quite the contrary - surveys of criminals indicates that 
they usually have access to multiple sources of guns (Wright and Rossi 1986; 
Sheley and Wright 1995).  Therefore, the number of criminals who could get 
guns only if traffickers operated in their area is necessarily even smaller than 
the number who actually do acquire guns as a result of trafficking activity. 
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BATF CASE FILE EVIDENCE ON HIGH VOLUME TRAFFICKERS 
Few of the criminals prosecuted for “trafficking,” however, operate on a 
big scale.  Although BATF’s stated, and quite sensible, goal is “recommending 
for prosecution the most active illegal firearms traffickers” (U.S. BATF 1998, 
p. 16), the average number of firearms known to have been trafficked per gun 
trafficking defendant was just 20 in fiscal years 1996 and 1997, and even these 
few guns were, in many cases, trafficked over a period of several years (U.S. 
BATF 1998, p. 17).  Thus, BATF denoted “traffickers” are mostly very low 
volume operators.  Traffickers not recommended for prosecution, or not 
investigated at all by BATF, almost certainly averaged even fewer guns. 
BATF’s 1994 Firearms Enforcement Investigative Report (U.S. BATF 
1995a), a report detailing BATF’s most significant firearms investigative 
achievements, listed only five cases, among those resulting in arrests in 1993, 
that involved 100 or more trafficked guns, and just three such cases among 
those resulting in arrest in 1994 (pp. 29, 37, 48, 50-52, 61).  Thus, although it 
is strongly motivated to do so, BATF rarely uncovers large-scale gun 
traffickers.  Unless BATF is almost completely ineffective in identifying and 
prosecuting such criminals, high-volume gun traffickers would appear to be 
extremely rare, even using a generous definition of “high-volume.” 
Pierce and his colleagues have suggested that licensed dealers to whom 
many crime guns have been traced, with a short average time-to-crime for the 
traced guns, might “warrant the allocation of [BATF] investigatory resources,” 
presumably because such persons are more likely to be corrupt dealers (p. 13). 
Their analysis of two years’ worth of BATF traces indicated that just 110 
dealers (0.1% of the dealers) accounted for 19.9% of traces and had an average 
time-to-crime of less that three years (p. 18).  The authors’ discussion is likely 
to have lead some readers to infer that this concentration of traced crime guns 
among dealers implies that a signficant share of crime guns are supplied by 
corrupt dealers (p. 13). 
Such an inference would be unwarranted.  Such concentrations would 
result, even in the complete absence of corrupt licensees, from nothing more 
than the simple fact that crime is very unevenly distributed across space, with a 
small number of areas accounting for a large share of gun crimes.  Licensees 
operating in a relatively small number of high crime areas would account for a 
disproportionately large share of crime guns and gun traces even if all of their 
sales were properly recorded transfers to legally eligible recipients.  Thus, the 
concentration of gun traces among licensed dealers indicates nothing about the 
prevalence of corrupt dealers. 
THEFT AS THE MAJOR ULTIMATE SOURCE OF CRIME GUNS 
Given the weak evidence supporting the hypothesis that significant 
numbers of criminals obtain their guns as a result of gun traffickers’ activities, 
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the question remains: how do criminals get their guns?  In the Wright and 
Rossi survey of state prison inmates, only 3% of felons who had owned 
handguns prior to their incarceration reported getting their most recent 
handgun from a “black market” source, though another 14% said they got the 
gun on “the street,” a phrase that could encompass some organized gun 
traffickers (1986, p. 183).  In the 1991 Survey of State Prison Inmates, the 
Census Bureau reported that 28% of inmates who had ever possessed a 
handgun had acquired their most recent handgun from “the black market,” 
from a drug dealer, or “off the street” (U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics 1993, 
p. 19).  Unfortunately, the report lumped these three sources together, so it was 
impossible to determine the share of handguns solely attributable to persons 
whom the felons believed made their living from selling guns. 
There appears to be stronger evidence pointing to theft as a major source of 
guns for criminals than illicit trafficking. Perhaps about half of the guns 
obtained by criminals have probably been stolen at some time in the past, 
though not necessarily by the criminal who most recently possessed it and used 
it in a crime.  Among the felons interviewed by Wright and Rossi (1986) in 
prison, about 32% of their most recently acquired handguns were obtained by 
the felon by stealing the gun himself. Further, taking into account the felons’ 
knowledge about gun thefts by previous possessors, 46% stated that their most 
recently acquired handgun was “definitely stolen” (a set of felons that 
presumably includes the 32% who stole the gun themselves), while another 
24% said the gun was “probably stolen” (Wright and Rossi 1986, pp. 185, 193-
197). 
The most common method for obtaining handguns was by a cash purchase 
- 43% of the felons got their most recent handgun this way.  Few of these 
buyers, however, purchased the gun from a black market dealer, since only 3% 
of all handgun-owning felons reported getting a gun from such a source.  A 
significant minority, 16%, of all such felons bought their handgun from a retail 
outlet, presumably a licensed dealer. While some of these might have been 
purchased from corrupt dealers (the survey did not establish this), many of 
them could have been obtained in perfectly legal transactions because the 
buyer had no criminal convictions in his record at the time, or because there 
was no state criminal records background check required for a gun purchase. 
Based on surveys of juveniles in 1991, Sheley and Wright (1995) stated 
that it was “highly likely that theft and burglary were the ultimate source of 
many (perhaps most) of the guns possessed by juveniles in our study, but only 
occasionally the proximate source” (p. 48).  Almost half of juvenile inmates 
reported that they had stolen a gun at some time in their lives (Sheley and 
Wright 1993, p. 6).  The authors concluded that the proximate sources of guns 
were most commonly “family, friends, and street sources” (Sheley and Wright 
1995, p. 46). Unfortunately, they did not report how many of the “street 
sources” might have been illicit gun dealers.  A few (7%) juveniles claimed to 
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have purchased their most recent handgun from a retail outlet (Sheley and 
Wright 1993, p. 6), even though it is unlawful for licensed dealers to sell 
handguns to persons under the age of 21.  These may, however, have been 
cases where the juvenile got an adult to buy the gun for them at a store, since 
32% of all of the juvenile inmates reported that they had asked an adult (most 
commonly a friend) to make a purchase at a retail outlet on their behalf (Sheley 
and Wright 1995, p. 48). 
The general picture from surveys of criminals is that they get guns from 
many diverse sources, but only a few via purchase from a licensed dealer.  
Unrecorded purchases from various relatives, friends, and acquaintances who 
are not in the business of selling guns are probably the primary means of 
directly obtaining guns, while theft may be the ultimate source of most crime 
guns. 
It would be helpful if there were reliable national law enforcement data on 
gun theft, but unfortunately there are not. The FBI’s National Crime 
Information Center (NCIC) maintains records of gun thefts, but apparently 
only a tiny share of thefts are reported to this agency.  For example, in a 
sample of 66 guns determined by BATF to have been stolen, not a single one 
had been reported stolen to NCIC (Brill 1977, p. 102).  Brill concluded that 
some police did not report thefts to NCIC that had been reported to them, but 
that “a more significant problem is that it is likely that a firearm theft never 
will be reported to the police.  Someone who has not had to register the 
firearm, or who has ignored a request to register it, is not likely to report its 
theft” (p. 103). 
The best source of information on the volume of gun theft is the National 
Crime Victimization Survey, a large-scale household survey of the population 
conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau. Based on this source, there are an 
estimated 341,000 incidents of gun theft in the U.S. each year (U.S. Bureau of 
Justice Statistics 1994), while data from another Justice Department-financed 
survey indicated about 2.2 guns stolen per incident (Cook and Ludwig 1997, p. 
30).  These figures imply about 750,000 guns stolen from households each 
year.  This is probably a conservative estimate for two reasons: it does not 
adjust for NCVS respondents who fail to report gun thefts to government 
interviewers (e.g. thefts of guns obtained illegally or without proper 
registration), and 2.2 guns stolen per theft incident seems to be a low figure in 
light of the fact that there are an average of about 5 guns per gun-owning 
household in the U.S. (Kleck 1997, p. 69).  Thus, even a conservative estimate 
of the national gun theft total indicates that there is a huge flow of guns into 
criminal hands via theft. 
Given that there could be as few as 100,000-200,000, and probably no 
more than 500,000, different guns used to commit crimes each year (Kleck 
1997, p. 92), an annual total of 750,000 stolen guns means that a single year’s 
worth of gun thefts from the existing civilian gun stock would be sufficient all 
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by itself to easily meet all criminal demand for guns to use in crime, even if no 
further guns were manufactured, sold to criminals or indirectly supplied to 
them through non-theft means such as illicit gun trafficking. 
An ample supply of stolen guns would tend to depress black market gun 
prices and make it hard to make a profit through illicit gun dealing.  This 
would be especially true for illicit dealers who obtained guns by using straw 
purchasers in states with less strict gun laws to buy guns at full retail price.  To 
make a profit after paying fees to the straw purchasers and covering 
transportation and other costs, such dealers would have to charge prices 
substantially higher than retail price.  Only in areas where it was hard for a 
criminal to obtain guns legally via their own purchase, by theft, or by purchase 
of a stolen gun would there be significant numbers of customers willing to pay 
prices substantially over retail. 
The level of gun theft, of course, is not uniform across the U.S., so in areas 
with lower gun ownership rates, the gun theft rate is also probably lower.  
Thus, there may well be unusual areas, such as New York City, Washington, 
D.C., or Boston, where the supply of legally owned guns and stolen guns 
circulating among criminals is low enough to leave room for criminal 
entrepreneurs to make a living selling guns illegally.  Such areas, however, 
would seem to be the exception rather than the rule, in light of the high 
national gun theft level. 
A survey of adult prisoners conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau (1993) 
provided a deviant result regarding theft as a means of gun acquisition among 
criminals.  Only 9% of the prisoners in this survey admitted having stolen the 
last gun they had acquired before going to prison (p. 19).  This theft share is 
implausibly low for adult offenders, when compared either to the 32% figure 
obtained by Wright and Rossi (1986, p. 185) or to the 24% figure obtained by 
Burr (1977). 
It is also implausible when assessed in light of the known volume of gun 
theft.  If one accepted the 9% figure, it would necessarily imply that the total 
number of guns acquired by criminals was 11.1 (100%/9%) times the number 
they stole.  With a conservative estimate of 750,000 guns stolen annually, this 
would imply at least 8.3 million guns acquired by criminals by all methods 
each year, about 7.6 million of them (91%) obtained by non-theft means.  In 
the entire U.S., among criminals and non-criminals combined, there are only 
about 5 million new guns purchased in a typical year (Kleck 1997, p. 97).  
Since 64% of gun acquisitions are of new guns (Cook and Ludwig 1996, p. 
25), this means that there are only about 7.8 million (5 million/0.64) total guns, 
new or used, acquired by the U.S. population each year.  It therefore is 
implausible that criminals alone acquire 7.6 million guns by non-theft means 
each year.  Since the Census Bureau survey’s 9% theft figure necessarily 
implies this implausible figure, it cannot be accepted.  It may be that prisoners 
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are unwilling to admit previous thefts when speaking to interviewers working 
for the federal government. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Based on the evidence currently available, organized high-volume gun 
trafficking appears to account for a few percent of the guns acquired by 
criminals, and this modest flow of guns may well be largely concentrated in 
only a few cities with unusually strict gun control, such as New York City, 
Washington, D.C., and Boston.  Criminals do not typically get guns from 
people in the business (even the part-time business) of illegally selling guns, 
but rather buy them from family, friends, and acquaintances, or steal them, 
while about 16% of adult criminals obtain their guns via a purchase from a 
licensed retail dealer (Wright and Rossi 1986, p. 185). 
Equally important, surveys of gun criminals have consistently indicated 
that, among both adults and juveniles, multiple sources of guns were typically 
available to any one offender.  For example, data from a survey by Sheley and 
Wright (1995) of juvenile inmates indicated that an average of three sources of 
guns were identified as certain or probable sources from which the offenders 
could obtain guns (computed from data on p. 47).  These authors noted that 
“most respondents felt there were numerous ways that they might obtain a 
firearm” (p. 46). Thus, shutting down one source would not imply a given 
criminal would be unable to acquire a gun.  In reply to the question “Where do 
criminals get their guns?,” one reasonable response would be: “everywhere.”  
The sources of guns are numerous, diverse, and diffuse, a state of affairs that 
should not be surprising in a nation with over 240 million guns circulating in 
private hands (Kleck 1997, p. 97), at least 750,000 of which are stolen each 
year. 
Criminals obtain guns, then, primarily by way of unrecorded, one-at-a-time 
transfers, some legal, some not, from people not in the illegal gun trafficking 
business.  A prototypical chain of possession of a gun that eventually is used to 
commit a crime, consistent with existing evidence, would be as follows: a gun 
is produced by a licensed manufacturer, who sells it to a licensed distributor, 
who sells it to a legitimate licensed retail gun dealer, who then sells it to a 
legally qualified buyer.  At some later point in time, perhaps after a few sales 
or trades among private parties, the gun is stolen, most commonly from the 
residence of its owner, by a burglar who (perhaps illegally) sells it to a friend, 
who later (perhaps after a few more unrecorded private transfers) commits a 
crime with it. 
As far as one can tell from the admittedly limited evidence currently 
available, organized trafficking of guns, whether intrastate or interstate, 
whether from the Southeast to the urban Northeast or elsewhere, accounts for 
no more than a tiny share of the guns obtained by criminals.  Consequently, 
enforcement efforts aimed at locating high volume dealers appear to be 
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directed at individuals who are rare (and non-existent in many places), easily 
replaced, and not especially important as criminal gun suppliers in any but a 
handful of unusual locales. On the other hand, enforcement efforts aimed at the 
far more numerous (and even more easily replaced) individuals who 
occasionally sell small numbers of guns are not cost effective. This suggests 
that the supply-side strategy in gun control needs to be reconsidered, just as its 
counterpart in drug control is being reconsidered. 
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